Director Training and Financial Disclosure: Asian Insights by Yasser, Qaiser Rafique et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
2017 
Director Training and Financial Disclosure: Asian Insights 
Qaiser Rafique Yasser 
Universiti Malaysia Sarawak 
Abdullah Al Mamun 
University of Wollongong, amamun@uow.edu.au 
Marcus Rodrigs 
University of Newcastle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yasser, Qaiser Rafique; Mamun, Abdullah Al; and Rodrigs, Marcus, "Director Training and Financial 
Disclosure: Asian Insights" (2017). Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive). 1700. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/1700 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Director Training and Financial Disclosure: Asian Insights 
Abstract 
We provide evidence regarding the relationship between director training programs and improved financial 
reporting. Director Training Programs (DTP) help directors better understand the specific context in which 
a firm operates, including its operations and environment; awareness of business norms and values; 
standards of probity and accountability; and their fiduciary duties as an agent of investors. This study 
explores a recent requirement for director training and its effect on the quality of financial reporting for 
publicly listed companies in three eastern countries. This study examines the relationship between DTP 
and the quality of financial reporting of Australian, Malaysian and Pakistani publicly listed companies by 
using a sample of data from 2011 to 2013. We determined that Australian companies that incur 
additional DTP expenditures and have a flexible training schedule (Online DTP)improve their financial 
reporting quality and that a well-established DTP positively affects financial reporting quality in Malaysia. 
In addition, the results indicate that firm size negatively affects financial reporting quality in the Asia 
Pacific and older companies (firm age) suffer from low-quality financial reporting. 
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We provide evidence regarding the relationship between director training programs and im-
proved financial reporting. Director Training Programs (DTP) help directors better understand the 
specific context in which a firm operates, including its operations and environment; awareness of 
business norms and values; standards of probity and accountability; and their fiduciary duties as 
an agent of investors. This study explores a recent requirement for director training and its effect 
on the quality of financial reporting for publicly listed companies in three eastern countries. This 
study examines the relationship between DTP and the quality of financial reporting of Australian, 
Malaysian and Pakistani publicly listed companies by using a sample of data from 2011 to 2013. 
We determined that Australian companies that incur additional DTP expenditures and have a 
flexible training schedule (Online DTP)improve their financial reporting quality and that a well-
established DTP positively affects financial reporting quality in Malaysia. In addition, the results 
indicate that firm size negatively affects financial reporting quality in the Asia Pacific and older 
companies (firm age) suffer from low-quality financial reporting.
Introduction
Recent accounting scandals in the international finan-
cial community have raised many concerns regarding 
the quality of periodical financial disclosures (Agrawal 
& Chadha, 2005; Bowen, Call, & Rajgopal, 2010). 
Several prominent companies have suffered from ac-
counting fraud and incompetent management, includ-
ing Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance, and Parmalat, 
which has weakened principals’ (investors) confidence 
in Agents (directors)and the eminence of financial re-
ports (Beekes & Brown, 2006; Brown & Caylor, 2006; 
Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; 
Petra, 2007). Now, more than ever before, directors 
must understand their fiduciary, legal and ethical re-
sponsibilities because the bar has been raised. Inves-
tors’ confidence in corporations has reached an all-
time low, and the role of directors has become even 
more challenging and demanding (Bowen et al., 2010; 
Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Grossman & Haskisson, 1998; 
Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005;). According to Sloan 
(2001), financial information is the first source of in-
dependent and factual communication regarding the 
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performance of a company and its directors, which 
makes financial reporting a primary indicator of man-
agement’s control and proficiency.
Doh (2003) suggests that individuals can be taught 
how to engage in effective board leadership and sys-
tematic training programs affect organizations’ leader-
ship strategies (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996; Dvir, 
Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002). Parry and Sinha (2005) 
investigate the effects of training and report a significant 
increase in leadership strategies and a significant effect 
on performance through the enhancement of trans-
formational strategies (Dvir et al., 2002). In addition, 
leadership training significantly affects self-reported 
employee variables such as employee commitment 
(Barling et al., 1996) follower development (Dvir et al., 
2002), satisfaction with leadership (Hassan, Fuwad, & 
Rauf, 2010) extra follower effort (Parry & Sinha, 2005) 
and certain objective performance measures (Barling et 
al., 1996). However, the impact of director training pro-
grams on the financial reporting quality is not well un-
derstood. Recently, the association between leadership 
characteristics and financial reporting quality has been 
discussed in developed countries. Emphasis was placed 
on specific governance mechanisms including insider 
domination of shareholding (Yeo, Tan, Ho, & Chen, 
2002;), board independence (Beekes, Pope, & Young, 
2004; Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006; Petra, 2007), di-
rector shareholding (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 
2007) and the reputation of the auditing firm (Agrawal 
& Chadha, 2005). Recent studies have analyzed board 
attributes and financial reporting quality in rapidly 
growing emerging economies that have distinctive fea-
tures of corporate control, capital allocation and regula-
tions (Bradbury et al., 2006; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 
2010; Firth et al., 2007).
Countries around the world are characterized by 
their corporate governance systems and scholars de-
bate the efficiency, superiority and effectiveness of 
these systems. We use a dataset that includes large 
Australian, Malaysian and Pakistani firms; these three 
Anglo-Saxon countries have common characteristics 
in terms of their basic governance systems (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Prowse 
(1992) suggests that judgments are inherently subjec-
tive because of sparse evidence regarding the rela-
tive performance of different corporate governance 
systems. Existing studies have generally examined 
the effects of corporate governance characteristics of 
firms that operate in only one country on earnings 
management (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 
2010; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna 2007; Yasser & 
Mamun, 2015). In this study, we seek to fill this gap in 
the extant literature.
This study seeks to analyze the following question: 
Do the director training programs of publically listed 
companies affect the quality of their financial report-
ing? To address this question, we built a dataset by col-
lecting data from the Australian Stock Exchange, the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Pakistan Stock 
Exchange. We empirically analyzed the effect of direc-
tor training programs on earnings management by 
examining a sample of matched industrial companies 
that are listed on the stock exchanges of the sample 
countries. Data were collected from annual reports 
and when necessary, these data were complemented 
and crosschecked with the corporate websites of the 
sample companies. First, we provide a review of prior 
empirical studies, which is followed by our hypoth-
eses, the method, the study results, a discussion, and 
the conclusion.
Review of Prior Studies and 
Hypotheses
Mole (2000) distinguishes between training, education 
and development and proposes that training focuses 
on the present job, education focuses on a future job, 
and development focuses on the organization. Al-
though some of the more traditional modes of provi-
sion, particularly for formal management programs, 
seek to enhance skills and knowledge and adopt a 
training approach, the current trend focuses more on 
education and development as indicated by the follow-
ing statement: “Development programs prepare indi-
viduals to move in the new directions that organiza-
tional change may require” (Mole, 2000, p. 22).
Professional development is an important topic that 
is related to the characteristics of top management 
because it is related to distinct patterns of decision 
makers’ cognitive processes, attention and final deci-
sions (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In addition, Ham-
brick and Fukutomi (1991) suggest that managers are 
generally engaged in complicated, ambiguous and 
information overloaded situations. This implies that 
managers operate within a finite model or paradigm 
www.ce.vizja.pl
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despite making use of all of the available information. 
Long-tenured managers are fixated on this paradigm, 
which makes it difficult for them to pay a great deal of 
attention to outside sources of information.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that the demo-
graphic characteristics of top management including 
experience, age, gender and tenure affect their values 
and cognitive bases, which subsequently affect their 
decision-making and choices, particularly in complex 
situations and ultimately result in different organiza-
tional outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) devel-
oped an innovative design to determine that manag-
ers’ personal characteristics influence their investment 
or financial decisions after controlling for firm and 
time fixed effects. This methodology has been applied 
by other studies, including Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 
(2010), which demonstrated that executives’ disclosure 
styles are related to their personal backgrounds. These 
scholars argue that older executives use a conservative 
disclosure style and finance and accounting managers 
use a more precise disclosure style.
Although numerous studies have examined wheth-
er financial reporting quality is influenced by vari-
ous governance mechanisms, generally, the empirical 
evidence has been mixed (Armstrong et al., 2010). In 
addition, prior studies that examine managerial com-
pensation and its impact on financial reporting have 
failed to produce consistent results. Furthermore, cer-
tain studies have determined that a negative relation-
ship exists between directors’ equity incentives and the 
quality of financial reporting (Bergstresser & Philip-
pon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Efendi, Srivastava, 
& Swanson, 2007); however, certain studies were un-
able to confirm that a relationship exists between di-
rectors’ equity incentives and the quality of financial 
reporting (Baber, Liang, & Zhu, 2012; Erickson, Han-
lon, & Maydew, 2006) and other studies reported that 
a positive relationship exists (Armstrong et al., 2010).
Studies that have examined the effects of various 
features of boards of directors on financial reporting 
have determined that more independent boards are 
associated with higher quality reporting (Efendi et al., 
2007; Klein, 2002); however, other studies provided 
little evidence that board independence has a signifi-
cant impact on financial reporting quality (Agarawal 
& Chadha, 2005; Kim & Qi, 2010; Larcker et al., 2007). 
Although numerous factors may contribute to the 
mixed results that are reported by extant literature, 
the joint endogeneity of corporate governance and fi-
nancial reporting represents perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge (Armstrong et al., 2010). In addition, a compa-
nies’ selection of a particular governance mechanism 
is endogenously determined by numerous factors, in-
cluding firm fundamental characteristics, information 
environments, other governance mechanisms, and 
managerial attributes.
Most prior studies regarding the quality of finan-
cial reporting have focused on firm characteristics 
and other environmental factors (Dechow & Dichev, 
2002; Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). However, agency 
theory suggests that decision makers are affected by 
contractual incentives and an organization’s monitor-
ing mechanisms and growth (Decker & Calo, 2007; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998;). Conversely, the up-
per echelons theory suggests that directors’ demo-
graphic characteristics and skills are associated with 
their unique cognitive styles and values and affect the 
managerial decision-making processes (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) documented that executive’s demo-
graphic characteristics affect their decision-making 
capacity and accounting policies. In addition, Bamber 
et al. (2010) and Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) 
suggest that executive-specific fixed effects reflect sys-
tematic differences in executives’ disclosure styles and 
tax avoidance strategies.
Prior studies propose that executive training can be 
used to develop needed competencies and help com-
panies’ strategic personnel to succeed in their specific 
organizational contexts (Burke & Hutchins, 2007). 
The effectiveness of director training has been studied 
from three different perspectives: the effects of training 
on attitudinal outcomes of trainees (Howell & Frost, 
1989), the effects of training on subordinates’ task per-
formance (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996) and the impact 
of training on financial outcomes (Barling et al., 1996).
Studies regarding the impact of training on skill de-
velopment have demonstrated that this effect is stron-
ger for technical training than more complex types of 
managerial training programs and the effects of train-
ing are more significant for skills that can be segment-
ed into step-by-step routines than for soft skills (Hunt 
& Baruch, 2003). Training could amplify the benefits 
of learning routines if regular reviews of performance 
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trends are conducted through performance analysis, 
problem solving, and oral communication skills. In 
addition, training may better leverage discretion by 
increasing management’s capacity to diagnose and re-
design processes or by facilitating the appropriate use 
of targets and incentives to motivate employees (Kim 
& Qi, 2010).
Executive training conveys basic information re-
garding reform and its requirements; simply knowing 
more about a reform may encourage employees to im-
plement the reform. This type of declarative knowledge 
(information about something) is generally perceived 
as inferior to procedural or tacit knowledge (informa-
tion about how or which, when, and why) (Aguinis & 
Kraiger, 2009). However, providing information re-
garding important reform concepts, changes to central 
processes and routines, and expectations and rewards 
appear to be related to fundamental lower-order con-
ditions for behavioral change. Prior studies have exam-
ined the effects of various features of boards of direc-
tors on financial reporting quality, but the results are 
mixed. For example, certain studies determined that 
directors’ financial expertise is associated with higher 
quality reporting (e.g., Klein, 2002; Efendi et al., 2007), 
but other studies were unable to confirm that direc-
tors’ financial expertise had a significant impact on 
the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Agarawal and 
Chadha, 2005; Larcker et al., 2007). Therefore, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Director training programs have a positive 
impact on financial reporting quality.
Regulatory Framework for Director 
Training
A code of corporate governance is the primary regu-
latory framework for a company according to statutes 
that have been enacted to improve the governance 
practices of firms that operate in each of the sample 
countries. Guidelines for developing code of corporate 
governance for promoting Director Training Programs 
(DTP) for each of the sample countries are as follows:
• Malaysia
 The Malaysian revised code of corporate gover-
nance (2012) recommends that the board of direc-
tors ensures that its members have access to appro-
priate continuing education programs. In addition, 
the code of corporate governance should include 
the following:
 “In a dynamic and complex business environment, 
it is imperative that directors devote sufficient time 
to update their knowledge and strengthen their skills 
through appropriate continuing education programs 
and life-long learning. This will enable directors to sus-
tain their active participation in board deliberations. 
Director(s) should notify the chairman of the board of 
the planned and estimated time that will be spent on 
the training and development of new directorship ap-
pointments before accepting any new directorship. The 
nominating committee is responsible for reviewing the 
director’s training program” (Section 4.2).
• Australia
 The Codes of corporate governance that were is-
sued in 2014 focus on DTP and require that each 
listed entity have a program for inducting new 
directors and providing appropriate professional 
development opportunities for directors to develop 
and maintain the skills and knowledge that direc-
tors need to effectively perform their roles.
 “The board or nomination committee of a listed en-
tity should regularly review whether the directors as a 
group have the skills, knowledge and familiarity with 
the entity and its operating environment required to 
effectively fulfill their role on the board and on board 
committees and, where any gaps are identified, con-
sider what training or development could be under-
taken to fill those gaps. Where necessary, the entity 
should provide resources to help develop and main-
tain its directors’ skills and knowledge. This includes, 
in the case of a director who does not have specialist 
accounting skills or knowledge, ensuring that he or she 
has a sufficient understanding of accounting matters 
to fulfill his or her responsibilities in relation to the 
entity’s financial statements. It also ensures that all 
directors receive ongoing briefings on developments in 
accounting standards” (Section 2.6).
• Pakistan
 The revised Codes of corporate governance that 
were issued in 2012 specify the requirements for 
www.ce.vizja.pl
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director training programs of locally listed compa-
nies by stating the following:
 “All listed companies shall make appropriate arrange-
ments to provide orientation courses for their directors 
to acquaint them with this code, applicable laws, their 
duties and responsibilities to enable them to effectively 
manage the affairs of the listed companies for and on 
behalf of shareholders. It shall be mandatory for all 
the directors of listed companies to be certified by any 
directors’ training program offered by institutions—
local or foreign—that meets the criteria as specified by 
the SECP. From June 30, 2012 to June 30, 2016, every 
year, a minimum of one director on the board shall 
obtain the said certification under this program each 
year and thereafter, all directors shall obtain it. Fur-
thermore, individuals with a minimum of 14 years of 
education and 15 years of experience on the board of a 
listed company local and/or foreign shall be exempted 
from the directors’ training program” (Section xi).
Research Methodology
The dataset includes a large sample of firms that operate 
in multiple sectors (manufacturing, services, agricul-
ture, and construction). We describe our sample selec-
tion procedure in Table 1. The primary constraint on our 
sample size is the availability of data from 2011 to 2013 
for companies that operate in Australia, Malaysia and 
Pakistan. The top indexed companies used in this study 
were obtained from the Australian Stock Exchange 
(AXS), the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and 
the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE); 33.3% of the firms 
in the sample were obtained from each stock exchange.
Multivariate Regression Models
In the multivariate analysis, we used the absolute 
value of the residue of the regression models to mea-
sure the quality of the accruals. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2005) used the standard deviation of errors in the 
estimation of accruals to measure the quality of the 
accruals; however, we use the absolute value of this 
residue. Multivariate regression models were used to 
analyze the relationship between DTP and financial 
reporting quality as follows:
 
Financial Reporting Quality = 
= AR + PAaccr + TCaccr + AGGRE (1)
 (2)
 
Dependent, Explanatory and Control 
Variables
The variables that are used in our equations are de-
scribed in Table 2.
Independent Variables
DTP starts (DTPY) refer to the number of year(s), 
beginning in 2011, that sample companies offered 
director training programs. However, the variable 
‘DTP expense’ (DTPX) represents the amount of 
money (in USD millions) that the company spent 
for the development of the board of directors dur-
ing the sample year. Because members of the board 
members generally have busy schedules, most com-
panies use online DTP. The variable ‘Online DTP’ 
(Online) represents the status of DTP delivery and 
is a dummy variable that is set as “1” as if the DTP 
is offline/physical and “0” otherwise. Specific AC is 
a variable that indicates the scope of DTP regard-
ing the needs of audit committee members. For this 
dummy variable, “1” used if the specific audit com-
mittee needs DTP and “0” otherwise.
Country Index Companies Percentage
Australia Australia Stock Exchange 90 33.33%
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 90 33.33%
Pakistan Pakistan Stock Exchange 90 33.33%
Total Sample Companies (Three Years: 2011 to 2013) 270 100.0%
Table 1. Selection of Variables
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Control Variables
Motivated by prior empirical studies, we include firm 
size, board independence, financial leverage and firm 
age as control variables (Owolabi, Obiakor, & Okwu, 
2011; Raheman & Nasr, 2007). To control for firm size, 
we included a variable for the natural logarithm of total 
assets (FSIZE). Firm age was calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the incorpora-
tion of the firm, which helped to control for the or-
ganization’s maturity (Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busentiz, & 
Johnson 2008; Matta & Beamish, 2008). The logarith-
mic form of analysis was applied to reduce heterosce-
dasticity (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Hutchinson 
and Gul (2004) argued that a firm’s leverage may lead 
to increased external control because creditors would 
monitor its capital structure more intensively to pro-
tect their interests. In alignment with Chen and Jaggi 
(2000), the debt-to-equity ratio (FL) was used to mea-
sure firm leverage.
Dependent Variables (Proxies for Financial 
Reporting Quality)
A solitary universally recognized measure for fi-
nancial reporting quality has not been developed 
(Dechow et al. 2010). This study employs three 
measures that have been used in prior studies and 
an aggregate measure is included for the follow-
ing reasons. First, this study focuses on financial 
reporting quality, which is multi-dimensional. 
Therefore, a single proxy may not include all of 
the facets of financial reporting quality. Second, 
the use of multiple proxies increases the adequacy 
of our results. Third, using alternative measures 
mitigates the possibility that results using one par-
ticular proxy capture a factor other than financial 
reporting quality.
The first measure is performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals as proposed by Ash-
baugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003), Kothari, 
Sr. # Variables Description
Independent Variable
(A) DTPY DTP Start (Year) Number of year(s) since DTP was launched for the first time.
(B) DTPX DTP Expenses The amount of DTP expenditures.
(C) SPAC Specific Audit Committee Training
Dummy variable and is ‘1’ if there is a specific DTP for Audit 
Committee members and ‘0’ otherwise.





Total accruals are measured as the change in non-cash current 
assets minus the change in current non-interest bearing liabilities, 
minus depreciation and amortization expense, scaled by lagged 
total assets.
(F) AR Discretionary Revenue The annual change in revenues and scaled by lagged total assets.
(G) TCaccr Total Current Accruals
Total current accruals are measured as the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current non-interest bearing 
liabilities, scaled by lagged total assets.
(H) Aggre. Aggregate Accruals An average of PAaccr, AR and TCaccr.
Control Variables
(I) FSIZE Firm Size The log of total assets
(J) FL Financial Leverage Total Debt/Total Equity
(K) BI Board Independence Percentage of non-executive director in board
(L) FAGE Firm Age Number of years from the incorporation.
Table 2. Definition of Variables
www.ce.vizja.pl
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PAaccri,t  total accruals is measured as 
the change in non-cash current assets minus the 
change in current non-interest bearing liabilities, 
minus depreciation and amortization expenses 
for firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets 
( Assetsi,t );  Revi,t represents the annual change 
in revenues scaled by lagged total assets;  PPEi,t
represents property, plant, and equipment for 
firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets; and 
 
ROAi,t  represents return on assets for firm i at 
year t. The residuals from the regression model 
are discretionary accruals. In our tests, we use 
the absolute values of discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for financial reporting quality. We multiply 
the absolute values of discretionary accruals by 
-1. Therefore, higher values of PAaccr represent 
higher financial reporting quality.
To calculate the second proxy, we align with 
Chen et al. (2007), McNichols and Stubben (2008) 




ARi,t  represents the annual change in ac-
counts receivable and ∆ Revi,t  represents the an-
nual change in revenues, scaled by lagged total 
assets. Discretionary revenues are the residuals 
from Equation (2) that are estimated separately 
for each industry-country group. Our third proxy 
is based on the cross-sectional Dechow and Di-
chev (2002) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006) mod-
el, as modified by McNichols (2002), Francis et al. 
(2005) and Chen et al. (2007).
       
          (3)
where, TCaccr represents total current accruals, 
which are measured as the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current non-
interest bearing liabilities, scaled by lagged total 
assets; OCF represents cash flow from operations, 
which is measured as the sum of net income, de-
preciation and amortization, and changes in cur-
rent liabilities, minus changes in current assets, 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
 
Revi,t represents 
the annual change in revenues scaled by lagged 
total assets; and
 
 PPEi,t  represents property, plant, 
and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets.
The residuals from Equation (3) represent the 
estimation errors in the current accruals that are 
not associated with operating cash flows and can-
not be explained by changes in revenue and lev-
els of property, plant and equipment. Because of 
the short longitudinal time frame that is used in 
our study, we align with Srinidhi and Gul (2007) 
and Chen et al. (2007) and use the absolute value 
of this residual as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Therefore, higher values of TCaccr repre-
sent higher financial reporting quality. To reduce 
the measurement errors of the financial report-
ing quality mechanism and to present evidence 
based on general financial reporting metrics, we 
aggregate these proxies into one score. In align-
ment with Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), we 
normalize all proxies and then calculate the aver-
age of the three measures as our summary finan-
cial reporting quality statistic (AGGRE).
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the vari-
ables that are used in our primary tests. The number 
of observations varies with data availability and selec-
tion for each dependent variable because we utilize all 
available observations for each measure of financial 
reporting quality.
The results indicate that the mean value of ‘DTP 
Start’ is lowest in Pakistan at 6 years and is 12 years in 
Malaysia and 24 years in Australia. However, DTP ex-
penditures are highest in Malaysia with a mean value 
of 29.61 million and are 21.23 million in Pakistan and 
29 million in Australia, with a minimum expense of 
0.20, 2.8 and 10 million in Pakistan, Malaysia and Aus-
tralia, respectively.
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Table 3 indicates that the number of firms that have 
specific audit committee training and development is 
lowest in Pakistan with a mean value of 0.66; in ad-
dition, the trend for online DTP is lowest in Pakistan 
with a mean value of 0.83. The firm age is 196 years 
for the Australian sample, which is the highest of all 
three countries, and the maximum firm age in Ma-
laysia is 72 years.
The correction coefficient analysis results of the 
variables are presented in Table 4 below. The results 
indicate that starting director training programs (DTP 
Start) early is positively correlated with financial re-
porting quality. However, ‘Specific AC’ was not cor-
related to any of the financial reporting measures. In 
addition, the other DTP variables were not correlated 
to any of the financial reporting measures.
Regression Results
Tables 5 through 8 report the impact of DTP on the 
financial reporting quality of firms that operate in Aus-
tralia, Malaysia and Pakistan.
Table 5 indicates that the dependent variable AR is 
positively associated with starting DTP early in Paki-
stan and Australia and DTP expenditures in Austra-
Australia Malaysia Pakistan
Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD
DTP Start 9.0 36.0 23.85 8.15 3.0 24.0 12.23 4.13 1.0 15.0 5.87 3.71
DTP Expense 10.0 43.0 28.87 6.81 2.8 58.0 29.61 12.11 0.20 170.8 21.23 81.9
Specific AC 0.0 1.0 0.87 0.34 0.0 1.0 0.87 0.34 0.0 1.0 0.66 0.48
Online DTP 0.0 1.0 0.89 0.32 0.0 1.0 0.88 0.33 0.0 1.0 0.83 0.37
Firm Age 11 196 89.64 50.14 3 72 34.13 14.88 1.0 106 40 25.81
Firm Size 3.70 5.91 4.81 0.59 3.14 5.72 4.55 0.63 3.77 6.23 5.03 0.59
BI 0.10 1.00 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.38
FL 0.00 1.21 0.13 0.22 0.01 1.50 0.19 0.34 0.00 2.12 0.32 0.48
AR 0.71 1.10 0.87 0.11 0.86 1.47 1.14 0.15 0.84 1.38 1.07 0.12
Paaccr 1.29 2.31 1.79 0.31 1.37 2.75 1.94 0.32 1.48 2.52 2.02 0.24
Tcaccr 1.46 2.77 2.19 0.37 1.73 2.86 2.35 0.28 1.83 3.47 2.54 0.29
AGGRE 3.65 6.12 4.87 0.76 4.58 6.40 5.43 0.44 4.48 6.76 5.63 0.42
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. DTP Start 1





4. Online DTP -0.070 0.123 0.357** 1
5. AR -0.202 -0.088 -0.080 -0.038 1
6. Paaccr 0.216** 0.091 0.069 -0.019 -0.879** 1
7. Tcaccr 0.318** 0.128 0.094 -0.034 -0.680** 0.780** 1
8. AGGRE 0.290** 0.120 0.083 -0.046 -0.715** 0.895** 0.963** 1
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 4. Correlation Coefficient Analysis
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lia are positively associated with AR. The results of 
the coefficient analysis indicate that the model used 
in this study is statistically significant at a level of 5% 
(p<0.05).In this study, the R² when AR was the depen-
dent variable was 65.9%, 56.7% and 38.7%, which was 
adjusted to better fit the model in the population and 
the final adjusted R² was 62%, 53% and 34.3%, respec-
tively, for Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan.
In addition, the results indicate that firm size is 
significantly negatively correlated with the financial 
reporting measure “AR” in Australia, Malaysia and 
Pakistan. However, Firm age is negatively associated 
Australia Malaysia Pakistan
DTP Start 3.70** -1.72 2.11**
DTP Expenses 3.93** -0.65 -0.29
Specific DTP for Audit 
Committee
-0.54 -0.23 -0.49
Online DTP 2.34** -0.28 0.78
Firm Age -1.13 -3.59** -1.57
Firm Size -7.08** -7.66** -6.63**
Financial Leverage 5.02 6.56 5.98
Board Independence 0.56 0.55 0.75
R² 65.9% 56.7% 38.7%
Adj. R² 62.0% 53.0% 34.3%
F-Statistics 17.03 15.34 8.75
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Australia Malaysia Pakistan
DTP Start 1.92 1.79 -1.23
DTP Expenses 2.79** 0.83 1.08
Specific DTP for Audit 
Committee
-1.78 0.27 1.68
Online DTP 3.27** -0.24 1.97**
Firm Age 1.167 -2.44 0.53
Firm Size -6.43** -8.25** -8.91**
Financial Leverage 5.88 5.74 6.59
Board Independence 0.59 0.85 0.66
R² 61.5% 57.1% 51.7%
Adj. R² 57.2% 53.4% 48.2%
F-Statistics 14.13 15.57 14.78
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5. AR as the Dependent Variable
Table 6. PAaccr as the Dependent Variable
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with financial reporting quality in Malaysia and the 
trend of using online DTP is positively associated with 
“AR” in Australia.
Table 6 indicates that the dependent variable PAaccr 
is positively associated with DTP expenditures and 
Online DTP in Australia. Online DTP is also posi-
tively associated with the quality of financial report-
ing in Pakistan, and firm size (FSIZE) is negatively 
associated with the quality of financial reporting for 
all three countries. The results of the coefficient analy-
sis indicate that the model is statistically significant 
at a level of 5% (p<0.05). In this study, the R² when 
Australia Malaysia Pakistan
DTP Start 1.09 3.05** -0.34
DTP Expenses 1.89 0.82 0.12
Specific DTP for Audit 
Committee
-1.02 0.48 1.71
Online DTP 3.46** -0.38 0.21
Firm Age 0.99 -4.19** -0.78
Firm Size -3.24** -3.88** -6.83**
Financial Leverage 4.59 5.15 5.25
Board Independence 0.84 0.67 0.88
R² 46.3% 42.3% 40.6%
Adj. R² 40.2% 37.4% 36.3%
F-Statistics 7.624 8.597 9.450
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Australia Malaysia Pakistan
DTP Start 1.82 2.66** -0.25
DTP Expenses 2.56** 0.88 0.58
Specific DTP for Audit 
Committee
-1.35 0.42 1.96
Online DTP 3.47** -0.49 1.45
Firm Age 0.89 -3.27** -0.75
Firm Size -5.20** -5.57** -7.58**
Financial Leverage 5.26 5.88 5.65
Board Independence 0.78 1.06 0.89
R² 57.1% 47.1% 45.6%
Adj. R² 52.3% 42.6% 41.6%
F-Statistics 11.76 10.42 11.57
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7. TCaccr as the Dependent Variable
Table 8. AGGRE as the Dependent Variable
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AR was the dependent variable was 61.5%, 57.1% and 
51.7%, which was adjusted to better fit the model in 
the population, and the final adjusted R² was 57.2%, 
53.4% and 48.2%, respectively, for Australia, Malaysia 
and Pakistan.
Table 7 indicates that the dependent variable TCac-
cr is positively associated with starting DTP early in 
Malaysia and online DTP is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality in Australia. In this study, 
the R² for the TCaccr dependent variable was 46.3%, 
42.3% and 40.6%, which was adjusted to better fit the 
model for the population, and the final adjusted R² was 
40.2%, 37.4% and 36.3%, respectively, for Australia, 
Malaysia and Pakistan.
In addition, the results indicate that firm size is neg-
atively associated with the financial reporting measure 
“TCaccr” in Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan. How-
ever, Firm age is negatively associated with financial 
reporting quality in Malaysia.
Table 8 indicates that the dependent variable AG-
GRE is positively associated with starting DTP early in 
Malaysia and DTP expenditures are positively associ-
ated with financial reporting quality (AGGRE) in Aus-
tralia. The results of the coefficient analysis indicate 
that the model of this study is statistically significant 
at a level of 5% (p<0.05). In this study, the R² when 
AR was the dependent variable was 57.1%, 47.1% and 
45.6%, which was adjusted to better fit the model in 
the population, and the final adjusted R² was 52.3%, 
42.6% and 41.6%, respectively, for Australia, Malaysia 
and Pakistan.
In addition, the results indicate that firm size is neg-
atively associated with the financial reporting measure 
“AGGRE” in Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan. How-
ever, firm age is negatively associated with financial 
reporting quality in Malaysia.
Surprisingly, firm size has a negative significant im-
pact of on the quality of financial reporting. However, 
these results align with Yasser and Mamun (2015).
Vijayakumar and Tamizhselvan (2010) document 
that firm size is related to transparency and firm val-
ue in the neoclassical view of a firm; this concept is 
referred to as economies of scale. Economies of scale 
may occur for various reasons, including financial 
reasons (a large firm has more resources to hire top 
professionals and consultants with the most advanced 
expertise); organizational reasons (specialization and 
division of labor); technical reasons (high fixed costs 
can be distributed across a large number of units). In 
alignment with this concept, we expect that positive 
relationships exist between firm size and firm age and 
financial reporting quality. Conversely, a conceptual 
framework that advocates a negative relationship be-
tween firm size and transparency is noted in alterna-
tive theories regarding firms and suggests that large 
firms are controlled by managers who pursuing self-
interested goals and therefore, profit maximization as 
the firm’s primary function may be replaced by a man-
agerial utility maximization function (Foss, Lando, & 
Thomsen, 2000).
Summary and Conclusion
To our knowledge, this study provides the first docu-
mented evidence of an association between directors 
training programs and measures of accounting qual-
ity that explicitly recognizes that a firm’s investment in 
accounting and auditing is not independent from one 
period to the next. Prior studies have provided con-
flicting results regarding the extent to which audit fees 
are associated with accounting quality (i.e., whether 
fees are consistently high or consistently low) and we 
can reliably identify instances where a conscious in-
vestment was made in more (or less) auditing; howev-
er, a director’s impact on the financial reporting quality 
was ignored. We argue that the relationship between 
measures of accounting quality and measures of un-
expected audit fees based on a single period are inter-
preted by relying on one dimension of agency theory.
The results of this study indicate that companies that 
operate in Australia that incur additional expenditures 
for DTP and offer flexible training schedules (Online 
DTP) report improved financial reporting quality. 
However, a long-term director training program posi-
tively affects financial reporting quality. These results 
are relevant because of the increased attention that 
regulators and other market participants have placed 
on the importance of director training programs and 
development in firm governance. The results may be 
of particular interest to regulators, capital market par-
ticipants and academics. Regulators may be interested 
because the results have policy implications when 
considering the quality of financial reporting and di-
rector development. Investors and creditors may find 
the results useful for evaluating investment decisions. 
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Finally, academics who seek to broaden their experi-
ences by serving on corporate boards may find the in-
formation useful in making decisions regarding their 
personal development.
The results of the analysis demonstrate that firm size 
and firm age negatively affect the quality of financial 
reporting. There are several possible reasons for this 
influence. Because of their market power, larger and 
older firms are able to charge higher prices and subse-
quently earn higher profits. In addition, higher profits 
could result from economies of scale and stronger ne-
gotiating power that provides larger firms with more 
favorable financing conditions. In addition to inflex-
ible organization structures and technology, a change 
in the strategic logic that is used by firms (it became 
more important to survive during a global economic 
crisis than to increase profitability) may explain the 
weak relationships between firm size and firm age and 
reporting quality.
This study contributes to the extant literature in 
three dimensions: first, this study combines market-
based and standard accounting financial indicators as 
measures of financial reporting to test the predictions 
of agency theory. Second, this study provides new em-
pirical evidence regarding the effects of director train-
ing programs on a firm’s financial reporting quality in 
all sectors of the Asia Pacific stock markets. Finally, 
this study provides additional evidence regarding the 
effect of director training on financial reporting in de-
veloped and developing countries by using the same 
variables and analysis techniques.
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